4.16 Collaborative management for conservation

Yves Renard

Collaborative management differs from other forms of participatory management in that it entails a conscious and official distribution of responsibility, with the formal vesting of some authority.

The term "collaborative management" (at times also referred to as co-management, joint management, shared-management or round-table agreement) describes a partnership among different stakeholders for the management of a territory or set of resources. The stakeholders — which typically include the agency with jurisdiction over the territory or set of resources as well as organizations of local residents and resource users — develop an agreement which specifies their respective roles, responsibilities and rights in management.

The agreement usually identifies:

• a territory (or set of resources) and its boundaries;
  
• the range of functions and sustainable uses it can provide;
  
• the recognized stakeholders;
  
• the functions, rights and responsibilities of each stakeholder;
  
• an agreed set of management priorities and a management plan;
  
• procedures for dealing with conflicts and negotiating collective decisions about all of the above;
  
• procedures for enforcing such decisions; and
  
• specific rules for monitoring, evaluating and reviewing the agreement, and the relative management plan, as appropriate.

Co-management also differs from what the literature describes as "community-based resource management" because it recognizes that it is not generally possible nor desirable to vest all management authority in the community. The state should and will always retain some responsibility, if only for the provision of an overall policy framework for conservation and management.

The justification for collaborative management is, in many respects, the same justification for participation which has been given elsewhere in this resource book. There are, however, three additional arguments which can be made in favour of the formal sharing of authority which is proposed here.

• The commitment of resource users and other stakeholders to a conservation initiative is likely to be stronger if they have a clear sense that they will be part of the management arrangements and decision-making bodies which will be established as a result.
  
• From a wide range of experiences throughout the world, it can be demonstrated that decentralizing management responsibility and vesting authority in non-governmental and community institutions as partners in collaborative management arrangements can result in more effective action. Through co-management,
  
• resources from the community can be mobilized and applied, and the need for enforcement and control can be reduced.
  
• It is important to consider that, through formal collaboration, and through the vesting of some of the management authority at the community level, a conservation initiative or programme can help in a much-needed process of community empowerment and local institutional development. In this manner, conservation contributes to a critical social development agenda.

Management agreements

By definition, the main element of a collaborative management arrangement is a formal agreement between two or more parties. There are various types of co-management agreements, depending on the conditions and requirements of each situation. In order to be meaningful and effective, a management agreement must involve the body which has legal authority over the resource or the area (usually the state) covered under the agreement. In cases where there were traditional users of a resource before the advent of the conservation initiative, it would also be necessary — except in very special circumstances — to ensure that they are part of an agreement. The parties in an agreement for collaborative management can therefore include state agencies, NGOs, local government institutions, community groups, cooperatives and other organizations of resource users.

Typically, a management agreement describes the object of the agreement (a resource, a protected area, an activity, a sector) and the parties to the agreement, and defines the rights and responsibilities of all parties. In this sense, the agreement must be a clear statement of "who does what", and it must cover all aspects of management: information collection and management, enforcement and regulation, uses of resources, allocation of benefits, etc. Typically, the agreement provides for the establishment of a management body which represents all parties and which is vested with some of the joint authority.

While the scope of management agreements can be very broad, experience shows that there are a number of key factors which are critical in ensuring their success and viability, and which must be included in their terms. These are as follows:

• there must be clear and recognized boundaries for the area at stake — co-management agreements will be ineffective if the object of the agreement is vague or ill-defined, or if the parties in the agreement have different understandings of the purpose of their collaboration;
  
• rights and rules must be clearly spelled out — agreements will fail to achieve their objectives if the duties and benefits of the various parties are ambiguously set out, if community partners do not have a clear sense of security, or if the allocation of rights and responsibilities is not perceived as fair by all;
  
• information must be made available to all those who participate in management decisions and control — information is power, and collaborative management demands that all relevant information be accessible. Otherwise, those who do not have access to the information will feel that they can be cheated, and they will not be able to play their role effectively. This demands that partners in the agreement participate in monitoring and research activities, and that data and information be interpreted in the appropriate form and language;
  
• there must be effective enforcement of rules —  perhaps more than other arrangements, collaborative management demands that those measures adopted and agreed upon be enforced effectively. In the case of more conventional regimes, like the management of a protected area by a national park authority, incomplete enforcement may weaken the effectiveness of management and the authority of the park service, but would not necessarily threaten the arrangement as a whole. In the case of a collaborative agreement, the failure by one party to comply, even partially, with the terms of the agreement places the entire arrangement at risk;
  
• there must be conflict resolution mechanisms — resource management is never static, conditions evolve, and it is always possible that conflicts will arise, at one point or another, among the partners in a co-management agreement. Therefore there must be, within the agreement itself, and within the institutions that participate in the management, forms and mechanisms to address and resolve these conflicts whenever they occur;
  
• all parties to the agreement must be accountable and there must be provisions for sanctions — a typical weakness of co-management agreements comes from their failure to make all parties accountable. It is obviously difficult for a conservation initiative establishing a collaborative management agreement to request that a government agency be made fully accountable to its community partners, and local political realities must be taken into account. Yet the objectives of making all partners equally accountable must be kept in mind, and there are subtle ways of achieving this. Similarly, the agreements must provide for sanctions in cases where a partner does not comply with the agreed terms;
  
• community partners in the agreement must be represented by strong institutions — a co-management agreement will not succeed unless all parties feel that they are on an equal footing. This demands that community institutions be strengthened to ensure that they are democratic, representative and effective in their roles as co-managers of the resources and their uses. Otherwise, there is a risk of implementation of the agreement being dominated by the strongest partner.

References

Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Collaborative Management of Protected Areas: Tailoring the Approach to the Context, Issues in Social Policy, IUCN, Gland (Switzerland), 1996.

4.17 Governance and the rule of law

Pascal Girot

The compliance (or non-compliance) of social actors to the rule of law is indicative of the degree of cohesion of society as a whole, and of the level of legitimacy of governing institutions.

One of the basic premises of social sustainability of conservation initiatives is that the governing institutions and laws that rule them be respected by all the relevant social actors and stakeholders. Compliance (or non-compliance) of social actors to the rule of law is indicative of the degree of cohesion of society as a whole, and of the level of legitimacy of governing institutions. Non-compliance and scant governance can seriously undermine attempts at incorporating social concerns into conservation initiatives.

Adequate governance depends on:

• the legitimacy of the political system and the resulting respect shown to its institutions by the majority of people, who comply to and accept the rule of law; and
  
• the efficacy or reliability of governing institutions (measured to some degree by the capacity of a political system to solve problems, and to achieve a consensus through compromise).
  

• the use of violence by interest groups or by a sector of society as a means of persuasion or influence over public policies and institutions;
  
• the chronic instability of public institutions, or their mandate, features or purpose undergoing constant change;
  
• the deficiencies of governing institutions, if the conflict-solving capacity of government officials and bureaucrats is so low as to encourage citizens to take the law into their own hands; or
  
• corruption and graft of civil servants, who use their public office to enhance their own economic and political interests.

Latin America is an interesting example to study and monitor the quality of governance of public institutions and political parties. A recurring characteristic is a clash between rigid institutions, where decisions are centralized, and emerging regional economic sectors with real power but political under-representation. Following several decades of revolutionary experiments, the heritage of political violence in Latin America also contributes greatly to situations of ungovernability, in spite of an overall return to democratic forms of government. For instance, the resurgence of armed movements, as in Chiapas, Mexico, illustrates that recourse to violence to defend local or regional interests is still seen as a valid option in Latin America. Mexico's persistent rift between rich and poor as a result of structural adjustment policies, and the growing repudiation of political and fiscal injustice, are also reactions to a situation of ungovernability.

How can a crisis of governance affect natural resource management and conservation initiatives? The most immediate impact is on compliance to the rules and regulations that govern the access to and use of resources. If the rule of law is replaced by the rule of factional violence there will be a direct effect on the way natural resources will be managed. Political violence, institutional instability, corruption and graft promote short-term, profit-motivated approaches to resource management, since shifting rules and regulations may curtail the capacity of certain sectors to gain access and rights to natural resources.

In many countries the instability and lack of efficacy in institutions governing land tenure have undermined the sustainability of conservation initiatives. The lack of compliance to the rule of law also reinforces the emergence of local caudillos, who are often linked to organized crime. The drug trafficking cartels in Latin America are an example of the regional and national power of these emerging economic sectors, and their capacity to impose their will, often through violent means.

In a context of ongoing structural adjustment policies affecting public institutions, the greatest challenge is strengthening local institutions in charge of managing resources. Decentralization is underway in many countries; greater responsibilities for natural resource management and law enforcement will be transferred to local governments. These arrangements will require building "nested institutions" that are flexi-ble enough to protect interests of national communities while providing for local needs. Respect for and compliance with these new institutional arrangements depends a great deal on their capacity to solve problems more efficiently. Above all, their endurance will hinge on their ability to stop the downward spiral of political violence, institutional instability and corruption by building upon legitimate groups and interests.

References

Alcántara Saez, M., "De la gobernabilidad", America Latina Hoy, Segunda Epoca, 8: 7-13, 1994.
Bataillon G., et al., Centroamérica entre Democracia y Desorganización: Análisis de los actores y de los sistemas de acción en los años, FLACSO, Guatemala, 1994.
Farr, J., Dryzek, J. S. and S. T. Leonard, Political Science in History: Research programs and political traditions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
Hardin, R., One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1995.
Ostrom, E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, London, 1990.
Selbin, E., Modern Latin American Revolutions, Westview Press, Boulder (Colorado), 1993.
Skocpol, T., Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, 1994.
Smith, P., Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis, Westview Press, Boulder (Colorado), 1995.
Sojo, C., Al Arbitrio del Mercado: Reformas Económicas y Goberna-bilidad en Centroamérica, FLACSO, San José (Costa Rica), 1995.
Torres Rivas, E., "La gobernabilidad centroamericana", America Latina Hoy, Segunda Epoca, 8: 27-34, 1994.

4.18 Decentralizing and devolving government

Barbara Wyckoff-Baird

Both traditional and elected authorities have an interest in developing the local community and in managing the natural resources that assist that development.

Webster's Dictionary defines "decentralization" as the distribution of functions and powers from a central authority to regional and local authorities. For example, a government agency hands over certain decision-making powers to their staff at the local level (i.e., at the branch offices of the same institution). In turn, the regional and local authorities work within the parameters of the mission and philosophy of their central agency and must keep the central agency informed of any actions they take.

Similarly, "devolution" can be defined as the transference of some authority from one body to another, most frequently to the more local level. However, while decentralization applies to a process internal to a given institution, devolution may involve and usually does involve different institutional bodies. For example, community institutions are given the authority to make and enforce rules for resource management in their area, or district councils are given the right to receive and distribute revenue generated from natural resources. The local authority may or may not share the mission and philosophy of the central agency, although the central agency believes that its objectives will be met by the local authority. Devolution implies the recognition of local authorities in terms of their rights and independence from the central agency or government, as well as the transference of certain powers. Too often, central governments decentralize their functions without really devolving them.

Worldwide, governments have tended to centralize decision-making, control and enforcement of natural resource management in government agencies at a national level. Yet these agencies have often proven ineffective at managing renewable natural resources, often bringing about resource degradation rather than sustainable use. Lack of funding, large-scale bureaucracies and struggles for power and political influence: they all limit the effectiveness of centralized agencies as natural resource managers.

Furthermore, these agencies are most often located in urban centres and are socially and geographically distanced from the resources and resource users in question. When a government ranger has to radio the head office for the permission to kill a problem animal and must wait days until the appropriate official has made a decision and sent the message back, the problem animal has long since moved on. The government and ranger have, once again, lost the confidence of the local community. Bromley and Cernea (1989) comment: "Unfortunately, most state property regimes are examples of the state's reach exceeding its grasp".

In addition, the potential effectiveness of central governments to govern and manage these resources is limited by the wide variability of the following: the natural resources themselves; the ecological contexts where they occur; and the social systems within which they are

managed. Central governments lack the in-depth local knowledge of resource potential and management patterns to be able to make and enforce appropriate management regimes. Users face a far more manageable problem: they only need to have a thorough knowledge of the resources found in their area. Experience has shown that a great many resource users have such knowledge.

The first step in devolving government is recognizing local institutions as legitimate actors in the governance of natural resources. In theory, this is not complicated; the national government must pass legislation officially recognizing these institutions, publicize it to all concerned, and provide for its enforcement. In practice, however, it is difficult to implement legislation in a meaningful way. Those who hold power are predictably reluctant to devolve it to communities. Not only do they fear that their own power base will be reduced, but they also may believe that resource users are not capable of governing or managing their resources for sustained yield and that trained technicians can do a better job. Experience (Murphree, 1991) shows that, even when power is decentralized to regional or district levels, the authorities at these levels may not take the additional step of fully devolving power to local institutions. Having been denied recognition and authority in the past, they are generally unwilling to pass on any newly won legitimacy to lower levels.

In community-based resource management, the central government recognizes local institutions and devolves to them certain powers, including the power to:

• make, modify and suppress rules (including who has rights to use resources and how);
  
• enforce rules;
  
• monitor application and compliance with rules;
  
• resolve conflicts relating to these rules; and
  
• mobilize resources to carry out activities.

Unlike the situation in other sectors, decentralization or devolution of current government responsibilities for natural resource management is at the sole discretion of the government. Frequently, legislation includes statements that the rights and responsibilities being devolved to the local level can be revoked if certain conditions are not met. It is generally the central government which sets these conditions and monitors compliance. Similarly, the rights and responsibilities for management of resources might be devolved to local authorities, while tenure or ownership are not.

The powers, rights, and responsibilities of central government over natural resource management can be decentralized or devolved to several different levels and types of structures. These include traditional or customary authorities, locally-elected community institutions, and district or regional bodies. Both traditional and elected authorities have an interest in developing the local community and in managing the natural resources that assist that development. However, if their functions and duties are not harmonized, the conflicts and overlaps of their activities can have a negative impact on the local community and, potentially, the natural resource base. In fact, the potential for conflict to arise between groups that have previously lacked the authority to assert claims to natural resources is often cited as a reason not to devolve authority over natural resource management and governance.

If the objective of devolving government is to increase the participation of local users in resource management, then local management bodies must be able to involve all users, or their representatives, in decision-making. Too often, decision-making bodies are elected or appointed and then forget to whom they are responsible and accountable. They make decisions in isolation from the resource users.

In development, and more recently in conservation initiatives, emphasis is placed on elected, representational structures as the primary mechanism for supporting community participation. There are examples, however (Wyckoff-Baird, 1996), where the very idea of representation, or of one person speaking for another, is foreign to the existing culture and beliefs. In such cases, individuals may be speaking just for themselves, yet outsiders believe they are hearing the opinions of the broader community. In other cases, where traditional or customary leaders are vested with resource management powers, representation can still be problematic. While customary institutions have several strengths and a degree of popular support and status, they are not always representative. This is particularly true of women and the poor, who are disproportionately affected by natural resource management decisions.

What seems to be critical to the question of representation is not whether outsiders (e.g., central government, project planners) have successfully identified each stakeholder group and ensured their voices are heard (a task almost impossible to accomplish). Rather, the challenge is to establish a process whereby the community itself can regularly review the stakeholder groups, identify new ones as they emerge, and assess whether the chosen representatives still reflect the opinions of the group.

While centralized decision-making and control has rarely worked, Swift (1995) suggests that the state has a definite role to play in creating the conditions necessary for effective resource management at the local level, including:

• establishing a policy framework conducive to sustainable resource management;
  
• providing a legal framework for resource tenure;
  
• investing in building institutional capacity at a local level;
  
• acting as an arbitrator of last resort in the event of conflict, particularly over boundary disputes, and guaranteeing equality of advocacy in disputes;
  
• guaranteeing minimum democratic processes in local administration;
  
• providing the appropriate macro-economic framework, including equitable policies on subsidies, transfers, and prices, and investments in infrastructure; and
  
• providing technical inputs and support in natural resource management.

References

Bromley, D. W. and M. M. Cernea, The Management of Common
Property Resources and Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 1989.
Murphree, M. W., Communities as Institutions for Resource Management, CASS, University of Harare, Zimbabwe, 1991.
Swift, J., "Dynamic ecological systems and the administration of pastoral development" in Scoones, I. (ed.), Living with Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa, Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd., London, 1995.
Wyckoff-Baird, B., "Democracy: indicators from Ju/'hoan in Namibia", Cultural Survival Quarterly, Summer 1996 (forthcoming).

4.19 Primary environmental care

Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend

People who work toward common interests develop a sense of solidarity and common identity, learn how to establish and follow their own rules and how to pull together resources and overcome problems.

Primary environmental care is an approach to community-based sustainable development matured on the basis of field experience. Many people and organizations — from both developing and industrialized countries — contributed to assembling this experience. Most of them worked in participatory projects in poor urban and rural areas. Some were involved in primary health care, and water and sanitation programs. Others worked in large and small "integrated rural development" schemes. Still others were simply concerned about improving their own quality of life — and that of their communities — by making optimal use of scarce resources. The knowledge and skills they acquired from their practice with methods and tools, their tribulations with con-flicts and failures, and their excitement with solved problems and satis-fied people, contributed to a consensus on what is important to strive for and how. To give visibility, legitimacy, incentive and impulse to such a consensus, a name was found: primary environmental care (PEC).

Box 15 Primary Environmental Care (PEC) PEC is a process by which local communities — with varying degrees of external support — organize themselves and strengthen, enrich and apply their means and capacities (know-how, technologies and practices) for the care of their environment while simultaneously satisfying their needs. In synthesis, PEC integrates three objectives: meeting local needs; protecting the local environment; and empowering local communities. The intelligence, experience, interests and priorities of people and communities, and their willingness to work together for common objectives, are what PEC is all about.

PEC's objectives are not new, but its approach integrates them. This affirms that the management of local environments becomes effective and sustainable when linked with the satisfaction of the needs (income, food, health, etc.) of local communities, and when all those concerned are involved and empowered to participate.

Meeting local needs means that people can maintain, produce or gain access to the goods and services (food, shelter, income, health care, edu-cation, transportation, etc.) necessary for life, health and well-being.

Protecting the local environment means different activities under different conditions (e.g., eliminating a fire hazard, cleaning and protecting a watershed, preventing flooding, halting an unsustainable extraction of timber from a local forest, improving tilling practices to protect topsoil, restoring a degraded communal building, leaving the habitat of wildlife undisturbed, etc.).

Empowering local communities means that communities, groups and individuals get more control over the factors influencing their lives. This usually involves several stages, in which people discuss and identify their common problems and opportunities and then organize and take action in partnership with others. Securing tenure for the natural resources protected by the work of local people is a most important element of the empowerment process, and is essential for sustainability. With security of tenure, in fact, the long-term economic interests of people tend to merge with the long-term 'interests' of the environment.

If a community engages in PEC, many sensitive issues are bound to be encountered, and many conflicts, between local and non-local interests and opinions, are likely to emerge. Such conflicts can arise in the planning stages (e.g., when trade-offs among environmental, economic and social goals, and priorities for action must be agreed upon) or during implementation of activities (e.g., when some try to take advantage of others, or problems and mistakes become apparent). Communities should always anticipate the active opposition of groups with vested interests.

The 'community' may only be united and well-defined in theory. Community members may not feel a sense of common identity, may not be equally aware or concerned about problems and ready to commit resources, and may not manage to achieve any consensus about what to do. In fact, major differences and contrasts are common among community members and subgroups. Women, ethnic minorities or religious minorities may not be allowed to participate in decision-making or in common endeavours on the same conditions of others. In such cases, PEC requires a significant change in local habits and departure from cultural norms. A lengthy process of community-building may be necessary before PEC activities can begin.

Local empowerment can only be based on the concerns of community members and their willingness to be involved. Certainly, it cannot be 'brought in' from outside. From outside, however, it can be impeded. In this sense, PEC needs to be 'politically feasible', a condition often difficult to achieve. Other constraints to PEC may be a lack of capital, information, expertise, or the incapacity of local people to organize, manage finances or deal with government officials. Supporting institutions (governmental and non-governmental, national and international, profit-oriented or solidarity-oriented) can help communities overcoming these constraints.

What are the challenges of PEC?

• the first is political: assuring people a fair amount of self-determination and control over local resources;
  
• the second is institutional: developing local institutions capable of gathering local knowledge and skills and delivering good ideas and honest practice;
  
• the third is socio-economic: assuring social acceptance and fair economic returns for sound environmental activities;
  

Last but not least, there is a challenge of intelligence and ingenuity: identifying the 'win-win' solutions by which both the environment and people can profit (for illustrations of PEC initiatives see the field examples 32 a-f in section 6 of Volume 2).

If the process of PEC is complex and difficult, its rewards are certainly worthwhile. People who work toward common interests develop a sense of solidarity and common identity, learn how to establish and follow their own rules and how to pull together resources and overcome problems. In the process, they create new employment opportunities, mobilize individuals and resources that were idle and under-exploited, and innovate and diversify the basis of their own livelihood. It is the experience of many communities that such initiatives can take off even with relatively small capital investment. When those initiatives benefit both the environment and the people, a sense of community responsibility for the environment grows and thrives.

In a general sense, any society that supports its people and manages its resources in a sustainable way is involved in PEC. In fact, such a society must include people who organize and take action to achieve those results, and PEC can be taken as a basic tenet of sustainable development, wherever it may apply.

In a more restricted sense, PEC represents a 'quality approach' to development cooperation. It is the approach of the NGOs and agencies that support communities to figure out for themselves how to respond to their needs and the needs of their environment. In this sense one refers to PEC programs, PEC projects, etc. These are characterized by:

• the full involvement of interested people and communities, from design to management and evaluation of specific plans (see section 5, volume 2);
  
• long-term, flexible support — no blueprint plans! — to meet needs (e.g., credit, information, technical assistance) as they arise;
  
• technologies that are environmentally sound and responsive to local needs and socio-cultural preferences (e.g., agro-ecology, agro-forestry, simple techniques for water supply and sanitation, hous-ing designed by local people, community-based disaster preparedness, development and demonstration approaches, community-run urban services, community-controlled tourism, etc.);
  
• great attention to the motivations and skills of all those involved (e.g., opportunities to exchange and discuss experiences, timely assistance and supervision, opportunities for training, etc.); and
  
• transparency (e.g., providing full information on who decides and is responsible for what) and accurate monitoring and evaluation (as a counterpart to flexibility).

Reference

Agarwal, A. and S. Narain, Towards Green Villages, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1990.
Bajracharja, D., "Primary Environmental Care for Sustainable Livelihood: A UNICEF Perspective", UNICEF internal report, 1994.
Borrini, G., (ed.), Lessons Learned in Community-based Environmental Management, ICHM/ Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, 1991.
Conroy, C. and E. Litvinoff, The Greening of Aid: Sustainable Livelihoods in Practice, Earthscan, London, 1988.
Davidson, J. and D. Myers, No Time to Waste, Oxfam, Oxford, (UK), 1992.
de Colombani, P., Meira de Melo, C. and H. M. Irshaid, Integrating Primary Health Care and Primary Environmental Care in the Health District of Pau da Lima (Salvador da Bahia, Brazil), ICHM/Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, 1990.
Development Alternatives, Community-based Management of Natural Resources, DA, New Delhi, 1991.
DGCS (Direzione Generale della Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Supporting Primary Environmental Care, report to the OECD Working Party on Development Assistance and the Environment, DGCS, Rome, 1990.
Holmberg, J. (ed.), Policies for a Small Planet, Earthscan, London, 1992.
Kitching, G., Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective, Routledge, London, 1982.
Lecompte, B. J., Project Aid: Limitations and Alternatives, OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1986.
Murphree, M. W., "Communities as Institutions for Resource Management", occasional paper of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1991.
Pye-Smith, C. and G. Borrini-Feyerabend, The Wealth of Communities, Earthscan, London, 1994.
Ralston, L., Anderson, J. and E. Colson, Voluntary Efforts in Decentralized Management, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Research Series No. 53, Berkeley (California), 1983.
UNEP, IUCN and WWF, Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living, Earthscan, London, 1981.

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